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PROCEDURAL REFORM IN INDIANA
By BERNARD C. GAVIT*
Mr. L. L. Bomberger's article1 ought to bring to the fore again
the entire subject of procedural reform in Indiana. The Indiana State Bar Association at its Mid-Winter meeting in Indianapolis in December, 1930, recommended the passage by the Legislature of an act giving the Supreme Court exclusive power to
regulate the entire subject of procedure. The proposed Act was
introduced in the Senate as Senate Bill No. 120; it received a
favorable committee report but was finally lost in the shuffle.
The Bill as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee A is
attached to the end of this article as Appendix A. The only
change made by the Committee in the Bill as proposed by the
Bar Association was that Sec. 3, providing for the employment
of assistants by the Court, was stricken out; largely, it is assumed because of the expense involved.
At the same meeting, it was suggested that the subject of
Appellate procedure ought not to wait until a general revision
of all procedure could be made, and the Bar Association directed
its Committee on Legislation to prepare a bill on that subject.
The Bill was prepared and introduced in the Senate as Senate
Bill No. 227. It passed the Senate but was lost in the shuffle
in the House. The contents of the Bill have never been given
general publicity, and it is published in full at the end of this
article as Appendix B.
It is submitted that the Bar Association ought again at the
1932 summer meeting consider the subject and again recommend
the passage of these, or similar Bills. With a view to putting
the matter before the Bar generally it is the purpose of the present author to discuss them at this time and to present the arguments in their favor. We shall take up the general Bill first.
II
The necessary starting point here is a compelling dissatisfaction with the present system in its practical workings. As to
the appellate and criminal features of it the dissatisfaction
seems both acute and more or less unanimous, so that it seems
unnecessary to enlarge upon their failures. On the other hand
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.

1 7 Ind. L. J. 341.
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there is considerable support for the proposition that our present Civil Code on Pleading and Trial Practice works very well,
and it seems desirable to point out in some detail some of the
objections to it. Part of the support for the present system,
however, it is feared, is simply the normal lawyer-like reaction
to any proposed change. Lawyers generally seem committed to
the dogma that a "lawyer must be conservative else he is no
lawyer." That proposition is more untrue than most general
statements. When a lawyer is dealing with the law of procedure
it is primarily, if not solely, in his capacity as an officer of the
court. Procedure is a mechanical step to the presentation of the
merits of a legal controversy. It is a part of the machinery of
the administration of justice. Theoretically and practically it
is a means of presenting a matter of substance for judicial decision. Its use for any other purpose is a mis-use.
Thus it is clearly true that a lawyer has no business being an
advocate during the pleading stage of judicial proceedings. At
that time he is simply an officer of the court, and his sole interest as a representative of his client is to see that the pleadings
fairly present his client's claims. A lawyer's interest in the law
of procedure is purely, therefore, an official one; he, nor his
client, have any vested interest in it. Of all portions of the law
here is the portion which owes its life solely to its utility; here
the only test is a pragmatic one.
If a lawyer must be a conservative in other fields he can
justly be nothing but a scientist in this field. He must appreciate that here at least there are no vested interests, and that
some changes ought to be tried, if for no other reason than to
prove or disprove the present hypothesises. That we have found
the perfect system of procedure is a postulate so startling and
unusual that even the most conservative lawyer should retreat
from it.
On the other hand it is well to call attention to the fact that
no system which can be devised will be perfect in its operation.
There are two stumbling blocks to any system. The first is the
one just mentioned; the system has to be worked by lawyers and
judges, who are far from perfect-and who may be far from
enthusiastic in their attempts to make it work. But it is certainly true that once we take the matter of pleading out of the
act of advocacy and put it into the official disinterested part of
a lawyer's business we will have done much to make any system
work. The second stumbling block is also a human one. Ignor-
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ance--"just plain ignorance"-is here again an immense hindrance. And it is not solely an ignorance of the procedural law
which is involved, but more often an ignorance of the substantive law. It is probably true that most trial lawyers know more
procedural law than they know substantive law, and that a great
many failures which appear to be failures of the procedural law
are after all due to the ignorance of the attorneys involved in
the field of the substantive law. The law of procedure is often
written in terms of the substantive law; and some simple or multiple point of substantive law forms the background of almost
every pleading. It is, to illustrate, highly improbable that a
lawyer who knows the rules as to the pleading the facts constituting his cause of action or defense, but who does not know, for
example, the law of deceit or estoppel, will be able to write a
good complaint or answer on those subjects.
Back of both procedure and substance necessarily stands the
learning and character of the lawyers and judges of the state.
So it is well to emphasize that our first concern is always with
the human element here. We continually need more learned
and higher charactered lawyers; and we must not overlook that
fact in any quest for an improvement of the administration of
justice.
But once we seek those better lawyers it is perfectly obvious
that they deserve respectable tools with which to work. It is
proposed to show that the Code of Procedure which exists in
Indiana today is not always a respectable tool.
III
1. The first objection is a re-iteration of what has been said
above. The Code allows, and perhaps even requires, a lawyer
to be an advocate during the pleading stage of the proceedings.
In spite of the fact that the judge and the lawyers are engaged
in a mechanical process having nothing to do with the real interests of the parties the judge is ruled out as an active factor in
the process. We still accept at more than its face value the
Common Law dogma that the burden of pleading is exclusively
on the parties, and that their errors or mis-steps can and do
affect the ultimate rights of the parties. No other known system of procedure has ever accepted that dogma; it has been rejected in England for over fifty years, and has been recently
rejected in a number of states in this country. There is every
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reason why the Judge should take the initiative in determining
what the issues are between the parties; and he should be in a
position to insist upon the attorneys assisting him in that quest,
rather than, as at present, offering all of the opposition possible.
Certainly some rules of procedure could be devised to reach
that desirable result. At least it's worth trying. It alone would
do more to put procedure in its proper place and make it a workable thing than any other one suggested change which can be
made.
2. The second objection is a corollary of the first. The code
as now amended puts the burden of pleading on the adverse
party. Unless the adverse party points out the defects in the
pleadings, either by a motion to make more specific, or a demurrer or answer the defect is waived. 2 Many lawyers take full
advantage of those statutes, say as little as possible, in as vague
terms as possible, and thereby put the burden of pleading on
their opponent. The Code permits that, and thereby actually
encourages a lack of co-operation, a selfish point of view, on
the part of attorneys during the pleading stage of the proceedings. Certainly no one will be so bold as to defend that particular result.
3. The third objection is that Code Pleading too often fails
to give adequate notice to the court, the adverse party, and often
fails also to form a permanent record of what was tried. That
is, it too often fails in all of its supposed reasons for existence.
(a) The first reason is that the Code requirement that the
written pleadings contain all of the material facts, alleged in
the form of operative or ultimate facts, is so difficult of understanding and application that it is not worth the effort in a good
many cases. We have, in effect, another Statute of Frauds applied to a procedural matter; and the result is as uncertain and
the situation as difficult as that presented by the Statute of
Frauds. But it is without any of its substantial benefits.
It is patent that an attempt to require parties to put their
ideas in written language is bound to cost much. Written language is a wonderful invention; but its perfect use requires
more time and study than most lawyers are willing to give to
the project. It is entirely possible (and it not often happens)
for the parties to a law suit to state their claims in good faith
only to find that the adverse party and the court did not under2

Secs. 360, 366, Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat., 1926.

PROCEDURAL REFORM IN INDIANA

stand the statements in the same sense in which the author did.
The discovery only comes during the progress of the trial, with
consequent quarreling and delay.
But even a perfect linguist would have uncomfortable difficulties in obeying the rule that the pleader must distinguish
between evidentiary facts; ultimate facts and legal conclusions
and employ only the happy medium of "ultimate facts." The
difficulties are not insurmountable; although their constantly
reoccurring and confusing character point again to the suspicion
that the effort may not be worth what it costs.
The difficulties arise principally out of our failure to realize
that the same word may have several meanings. The same word
may be an evidentiary fact; an ultimate fact and a legal conclusion. The distinction between an evidentiary fact and an
ultimate fact (if they do not mean the same thing in a given
case) is the distinction between words with a simple factual
content; and words with a complex factual content. It is made
necessary by the code requirement that the pleader be concise.
Thus if a series of events can be summed up in one word, that
word should be used rather than the words describing the series
of events. Thus if D hit X over the head with an axe and X
died as a result, a pleading in those words would be one objectionable because it contains evidenciary facts, for the reason
that the pleader could say that D killed X and get with conciseness the same result. But an evidentiary fact and an ultimate
fact may be the same, if a simple event produces a legal consequence. For example in an action of trespass P could well allege
that "D struck him," and he would charge a prima facie trespass. P could testify in those same words and make out a prima
facie case. "Struck" is both an evidentiary fact and also an
ultimate fact, because the law here gives effect to a simple event.
A legal conclusion is an allegation of law, and the difficulty in
distinguishing between it and an ultimate or operative fact
arises out of the truth that again the same word may have two
meanings; factual and legal ones. "Negligent" and "contract"
may be used as illustrations. "Negligent" has a common nonlegal usage; it also has a legal meaning (that is, it describes a
legal concept). Because the common meaning and the legal
meaning are more or less the same we say a pleader may use it
as an operative fact. Thus it decides no case to show that a given
word has a legal meaning; for the question should be, does it
also have a common meaning quite similar to its legal meaning?
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On the other hand "contract" in common parlance is something less than "contract" in legal parlance. As a common word
it probably entirely disregards the necessity of "value consideration." Thus it cannot be used in pleadings. Similarly "value
consideration" in law is quite different from "value consideration" in fact and is a legal conclusion. 8 Probably the best test is
that prescribed by the Code itself; would the allegation of fact
be intelligible to a person of common understanding? But the
test is a broad one, and in any event the requirement that the
pleadings be written statements of ultimate facts is certain to
result in any case of any complexity whatever in much confusion, misunderstanding and bickering over the meaning to be
attributed to the pleader's language.
For this reason pleading reform quite uniformly (except in
the simpler cases) has abolished the requirement that the pleadings state all of the ultimate facts. A pleader states his legal
conclusions and his exact position and claim is extracted by
means of oral statements and examinations.
It is after all quite apparent that in the more complex cases
which are finally litigated the pleading of the ultimate facts even
if conscientiously and artfully done gives the court and the opponent only a rather sketchy picture of the actual claim. The
opponent; if he relies on the pleadings, is more or less bound to
get fooled. If he is wise he has ascertained his adversary's real
position by a conditional examination under oath, or an exhaustive investigation of the facts. Good common sense usually compels the parties to a law suit to disregard the pleadings
as a means of anything more than a very general notice, and to
do in an extra-judicial manner what could more easily be done
as a part of the pleading stage of the trial.
(b) The pleading of ultimate facts and our Code procedure
in general inevitably leads to the development of issues which
are 'too broad. Under a general denial the adverse party can
compel his opponent to waste much time and money in the proof
of facts which are really not controverted. We have all seen
many times the trial of a mechanic's lien case in which the only
point in issue is whether the notice of lien was filed in time; and
yet under a general denial a plaintiff may be compelled to devote
3 The present author is publishing an article on the subject of "Legal
Conclusions" which develops in detail the propositions asserted above.
Those interested will find the article in the March, 1932, issue of the
Minnesota Law Review.
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hours or days to proving the title of the defendant, and the existence of the debt.
Much could be done to compel the parties to arrive at a narrower issue. While there seems to be a general fear on the part
of the legal profession that procedural reform might not be
framed to give adequate notice to the parties, the exact opposite
would be the result. The difficulty arises out of the fact that
"Notice Pleading" has been mentioned as a possible alternative.
The name has a misleading connotation; because the system of
"Notice Pleading" in fact developes much narrower issues, and
gives more detailed notice than is ever possible under the code.
The difference is simply that whereas the Code uses solely written language, "Notice Pleading" employs both written pleadings
and other more effective means of dealing with the problem.
We have been sold to the proposition that written notice thru
the pleading of all the ultimate facts is the best of all possible
systems. It is true that on paper the proposition presents a
beautiful and convincing picture, or theory. But in actual practice it does not work with any reasonable degree of objective
satisfaction. There seems to be no compelling reason why anyone should care to obstruct experiment with modifications of it.
(c) But even if we assume that it is possible finally to get
the written pleadings of the ultimate facts in such shape that it
can fairly be said that they are reasonably intelligible and give
a reasonable notice to the court and parties, we find that in any
case the perfect result is at best temporary and subject to
change without notice. Our waiver4 and amendment statutes,5
and our "decision on the merits" statutes 6 render the pleadings
as unstable as a South American Government. They are not in
truth even prima facie determinative of the issues to be tried;
they may be amended in any event; and after trial the Code
enjoins the trial court and the courts of appeal to disregard the
pleadings and decide all cases on the evidence. The real truth
is that in any given case the parties may not know what the
issue was until after the case has been decided. We have here
reached the other extreme of the Common Law rule that the
pleadings were always material; and our Code rule at this point
now is that the pleadings are never material. It is, of course
true that in some litigated cases the pleadings will have in fact
4 Supra, n. 2.
5 Secs. 368, 421, 423, Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat., 1926.

6 Secs. 418, 419, 426, 725, Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat., 1926.
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produced the issues actually tried; but this is solely because
the parties have intelligently, honestly and perfectly done their
job of pleading. Common observation of the trial work in this
state, however, discloses the fact that in too many litigated cases
the cases are tried and disposed of only under a forcible and frequent use of the statutes mentioned above.
Just how far the statutes go has never been fully appreciated
by the lawyers and judges of this state. Both the waiver and
amendment statutes have been amended within recent times
with rather far-reaching consequences, which it is worth while
to contemplate.
Prior to 1911 the statute on the effect of not demurring made
a failure to demur a waiver of all defects apparent on the face
of the record, except the insufficiency of the facts stated to state
the cause of action, and to show jurisdiction of the subjectmatter. In 1911 it was amended so that the first defect was
also waived by a failure to demur. The statute now reads:
"Where any of the matters enumerated in section 85 (the demurrer statute) do not appear on the face of the complaint, the
objection (except for the misjoinder of causes) may be taken
by answer. If no such objection is taken, either by demurrer or
answer, the defendant shall be deemed to have waived the same,
except only the objection to the jurisdiction of the court over
'7
the subject of the action."
The very apparent result is that a complaint which is insufficient on its face is rendered valid by the statute, and the cases
so holding are innumerable. The statute deals only with the
question of pleading involved, and it does not follow that if a
plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action a failure to demur gives him a right to recover if he
proves what he did allege. It is still usually necessary that he
prove a cause of action.8
But the provision of the statute as to failure to answer contains much dynamite. On the face of the complaint there is a
good cause of action stated. Obviously, under ordinary rules of
pleading, if the defendant has a defense by way of confession
and avoidance; or must plead specially in order to controvert an
allegation in the plaintiff's complaint and he neglects to plead
properly he will be precluded from presenting those issues until
he amends his answer. But those situations could hardly be
7 Sec. 366, Burns.

8 Thompson v. Divine, 73 Ind. App. 113 (1920), and cases there cited.
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said to be included in "defects" in the plaintiff's complaint which
do not appear on the face of the complaint and which must be
raised by an answer or be deemed waived under the statute.
There is no "defect," for the plaintiff has fulfilled his burden of
pleading; and the law puts the remaining burden on the defendant.
If the words "defect" and "matter" here are to be given anything like their ordinary meaning, it can only mean that the
"defect" is in not truthfully stating what the plaintiff has in fact
stated. Does the statute then impose upon the defendant the
burden of setting out specifically and affirmatively his version of
the facts? Does it, in other words, abolish the answer in general denial? No case has been found in which the purport of
the statute on this point has been discussed, but there certainly
are decisions giving it that effect. That is, if here the plaintiff
prima,facie proves what he alleges, he can recover, even though
the facts and law be otherwise.
It is quite clear, for example, that the question as to whether
or not a given plaintiff is the real party in interest is a question
of substance. A complaint which affirmatively shows that he is
not, or does not allege facts showing that he is, is subject to demurrer for insufficient facts. 9 But it has been held that the
question can be waived under the clause in question. Thus one
who asserts a legal right can recover although in fact and in law
he may not be the owner of it.1O
Such an interpretation would, if followed to its logical conclusion, be so revolutionary that it is to be doubted whether in
any event the courts would be justified in accepting it. But certainly it is true that a failure to demur allows the plaintiff to
prove much that he has not alleged, and the oft-repeated objection that proposed evidence "is not within the issues" is in most
instances under any fair interpretation of the code, an invalid
one. There are no issues, for the reason that the defendant has
not accepted his burden of forcing the plaintiff to write a perfect
complaint. Once he has collaborated with the plaintiff to the
extent that the code requires there is no evidence which the
plaintiff could have which is not within the written issue.
But once we get beyond the demurrer and answer stage of the
proceedings we find that all that has been done can be undone,
and the parties have no right to work upon the assumption that
9 Higgins v. Swygman, 194 Ind. 1 (1923).
10 City of Indianapolis v. National City Bank, 80 Ind. App. 677 (1923).
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the issue to be tried has been determined. The amendment and
variance statutes allow the changing of the issue almost without
limit. Section 421 of Burns allows unlimited amendments before answer, and amendment by leave after answer or during
trial. Section 423 allows amendment by leave after trial. The
latter statute in this respect was materially changed in 1921.
Prior to that the amendment could only be made if it did not
"substantially change the claim or defense"; but by an act of
1921 that restriction was stricken out of the statute.
Thus a party may change from one cause of action or defense
to another entirely different one. This is true before trial,"1
during the trial,12 and under the amendment of 1921 after trial.
Cases will be found which say the contrary, but an investigation
of them will disclose that they were decided under the statute
restricting amendments after trial to those which did not "substantially change the claim or defense"; or they really merely
hold that action of a trial court in allowing or disallowing a
radical amendment during trial was not an improper use of his
discretionary power. There is no question that our amendment
statutes allow the widest discretion in the matter and that a
party may well be (and often is) called upon to meet a situation
materially different from the one originally outlined in the
pleadings.
No-one could sensibly urge that any system of pleading could
dispense with some provisions for amendment. But the constant use of the amendment provisions of the Indiana Code, and
their enlargement, indicates that the theory of producing an
issue for trial by the exclusive use of written pleadings does not
work in practice. Their frequent use in practice is a bugbear to
every trial lawyer and judge, and a continual source of expense
and delay to litigants. We cannot get along without them under
our present system, but it ought to be rather patent that some
1i Farringtonv. Hawkins, 24 Ind. 253 (1865); Poundstone v. Baldwin,
145 Ind. 139 (1896); Cohoon v. Fisher, 146 Ind. 583 (1897); Frankel v.
Garrard, 160 Ind. 209 (1903); Royal Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 190 Ind. 444
(1921). The case last cited impliedly overrules the" case of Thomas v.
Hawkins, 13 Ind. App. 318 (1895).
12 Burr v. Mendenhall, 49 Ind. 496 (1875); Adams v. Main, 3 Ind.
App. 232 (1891) ; Frankel v. Garrard,160 Ind. 209 (1903) ; Denny v. Reber,
63 Ind. App. 192 (1916). There are many cases holding that an amend-

ment may change a cause of action, but the statute of limitations becomes a
defense. See, e.g., Boyd v. Caldwell, 95 Ind. 392 (1883) ; Blake v. Minker,
136 Ind. 418 (1893); William v. Lowe, 49 Ind. App. 606 (1911).
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improvements could be made, and the necessity for the application of any rule on amendments minimized.
When it comes to the decision of a litigated case, either by
the trial court or the courts of appeal the Code enjoins the
courts to disregard the pleadings and to decide all cases on the
evidence. 13 It may well be that there might originally have been
some question as to the constitutionality of those statutes (as an
invasion of the judicial function 14 ) but it is certainly too late
now to raise that question. The courts have resorted to them as
a basis for decision in many cases. The full import of them is
again that if a plaintiff plead one cause of action and prove
another he is entitled to judgment. 15 The erroneous overruling
of a demurrer where the plaintiff afterwards proves a cause of
action is not reversible error. 6 The sum total of the result is
that the courts cannot apply the doctrine of "the theory of the
case," and the decision on the merits statutes to the same case,
and that although "the theory of the case" bobs up in an occasional decision it has lost any real foothold. The pleadings are
no longer material in the determination of the case. Why? Because they ought not to be. Cases ought to be decided on the
evidence, without regard to what the parties thought they were
trying, in the absence of an affirmative showing that one side or
the other has not presented all of his evidence because he was
misled by the pleading.
But why cannot they determine before hand what real turn
the trial is to take? The answer is that they can, once we repudiate the archaic notions that the burden of pleading is exclusively on the parties; that it is ethical to deceive the court and
the adverse party as to one's real position; that the written
pleadings so produced can be relied upon to produce the real
issue between the parties. It takes a sharper instrument than
the Code to function properly here and the profession should
be given an opportunity to attempt to find it.
13 See supra, n. 6.
14 See, Noble v. Enos, 19 Ind. 72 (1862).
1r See, e. g., Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Gillespie, 173 N. E. 708
(1930) and note 6 Ind. L. J. 402. Cf., Southern Indiana Gas & E. Co. v.
Winstead, 175 N. E. 281 (1931) and note 6 Ind. L. J. 575.
10 See, e.g., the Gillespie case, cited supra, n. 15, and cases cited in

that decision. The court has reversed two cases where the trial court
instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict if he proved
the allegations of his complaint, but those cases are clearly distinguishable.
Such an instruction is a dangerous one in any law suit.
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We have struggled for the ideals embodied in the Code, and
we have struggled to protect the litigants from the more unfortunate results of its application in practice. As a result we have
the greatest set of contradictory rules yet known. On the one
hand the Code says the parties shall do so and so; on the other
hand it says, it makes no difference if they do not. The resulting situation is so chaotic that it is not far wrong to generalize
by saying that the rules of pleading destroy themselves and
leave us in a state of anarchy. The pleadings have actually become immaterial, and we should go back and re-frame our entire system of pleading on that theory, but at the same time we
must develop some system which will in a large percent of
cases really cut out the issue to be tried.
IV
The bill in question sponsors no patent remedy. It starts at
an obvious beginning; takes the subject matter out of legislative
control and puts it in the hands of the Supreme Court. It can
there be dealt with by experts and revised to meet practical
necessities. That the Court would attempt to adopt any system
at variance with local needs or so radical as to be destructive
is unthinkable.
Laymen are going to insist on procedural reform, and unless
the lawyers and judges of the state tackle the problem, it is quite
likely that they will have a new Code of procedure thrust down
their throats by laymen. Prior to the last session of the Legislature there were several proposals by lay organizations to tackle
the problem, but they were apparently headed off by the action
of the State Bar Association.
While this paper has dealt so far quite exclusively with the
civil side of the problem, it is only because the criminal and
appellate procedure problems are so acute as to need no emphasis. As to the criminal procedure side of the situation much
work has already been done in the publication of a model Code
of Criminal Procedure by the American Law Institute, which
could undoubtedly be suited to Indiana needs by the Court.
In conclusion the author would call attention to some of
the points in the Bill on Appellate Procedure, attached as Appendix B. To start with the time for appeal is cut down in the
ordinary case from 180 to 120 days. The proposed Bill abolishes
the distinction between term time and vacation appeals, and
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provides simply that an appeal is taken by the filing of a transcript of the record. A supersedeas bond may be filed in either
the trial or upper court; and notice of appeal may be served
before or after the filing of the transcript. In this connection
See. 11 contains the present statutory requirements as to the
substance of the appeal bond. It provides merely that appellant "will duly prosecute the appeal and abide by and pay any
judgment that may be affirmed against him." Under such a
bond the appellee is not adequately protected; for in the event
of a voluntary or involuntary dismissal his damages are slight,
for the appellant's promise does not in that event include the
payment of the judgment below. In the author's opinion the
bond should include that and the Bill amended to provide for it.
The most radical change made by the Bill is in its provisions
for the Record including the evidence and other proceedings
without special or general bills of exceptions. The reasons for
the old system are purely historical, and today they have no
persuasive power. Under the Common Law system there was
originally no review of the facts and trial procedure; the verdict
of the jury was inescapable. The record on appeal or review
therefore contained only the pleadings, verdict and judgment.
When the verdict became reviewable the evidence and trial proceedings were brought into the record by bills of exception. Today, if there has been a trial on the merits, under the statutes
discussed above, and particularly Section 725 of Burns, which
enjoins the court of review to decide the appeal on the merits,
few cases can be properly presented without a complete record
and all of the evidence. The present law compels the clerk to
keep a record of other proceedings, and there is no reason why
the evidence, and the instructions should not be included in the
record without any affirmative action on the part of the parties.
The Bill therefore provides that everything which transpires
during the proceedings is a part of the record, and it makes
provision for the formal inclusion of the testimony. All instructions offered and given are a part of the record without further
action, just as pleadings now are.
The Bill abolishes the exception. This is on the theory that it
has become a purely formal thing, serving no good purpose and
in fact merely adding unnecessary language to the record. In
most trial courts the exception is entered as a matter of course,
and there seems no sense in requiring that formality. The Bill
does not of course obviate the necessity of an objection.
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The Bill also provides for the correction of the record after
the record has reached the upper courts. Too many formal defects are now regarded as jurisdictional, and the Bill attempts
to do away with the harshness of that result. And finally it provides that no formal assignment of errors need be made. The
action is thus an action to review and while the Court may by
its rules provide for the formal presentment of error, the present
law of assignment of errors will not stand in the way of the consideration of any material point.
The Bill leaves much to the Rules of Court, and of course it is
anticipated that they will be amended to carry into effect the
changes suggested by the Bill, as well as those necessary to remedy the defects pointed out by Mr. Bomberger.
It is increasingly apparent that the Bar of this state must accept primary responsibility for an improvement of the Administration of justice. The changes suggested here are but a beginning. The Bar Association has before it a proposal for a
Judicial Council whose function it will be to accept that responsibility and deal with it. The adoption of that proposal and the
passage of the necessary legislation are two very important
propositions now facing the Association.
APPENDIX A
SENATE BILL No. 120

A Bill for an Act relating to legal procedure in the courts of this state
conferring certain powers upon the Supreme Court to make, prescribe
and enforce rules and regulations in regard thereto; authorizing said
court to employ persons to be used in the preparation of such rules and
regulations; and repealing all laws in conflict therewith.
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of
Indiana, That the Supreme Court of this state shall have the power to
make, prescribe, promulgate, regulate and enforce by rules the forms of
writs and all other process; the mode and manner of framing and filing
proceedings, papers and pleadings; of giving notice, serving and returning
writs and process, of all kinds; of giving, taking and obtaining evidence;

drawing up, entering and enrolling orders and the keeping of all other
records of the court; regulating costs; and generally to regulate and prescribe the entire procedure, including pleading, evidence and practice, to
be used in all the courts of this state, including the Supreme Court. Sep-

arate rules shall be made for civil and for criminal trial procedure.
Sec. 2. The Attorney General of Indiana, the chairmen of the committee on Judiciary A of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the
General Assembly of the State of Indiana, the president and the vicepresident of the Indiana State Bar Association and two circuit court judges
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of the State of Indiana, to be appointed annually by the Governor of the
State of Indiana, shall constitute an advisory council whose duty it shall
be to recommend and assist in the revision of the rules of court from time
to time. The Attorney General shall be the chairman of said council. Said
council shall be advisory only and shall have no power to change any of
the rules. The members of said council shall serve without pay but shall
be reimbursed out of the state treasury for expense necessarily and actually
incurred by them in attending meetings of said council outside the county of
their residence.
Sec. 4. Any rule or regulation made or adopted, as provided in section 1 hereof, shall be filed by said court in the office of the clerk of said
court, and said court shall by order fix the time for the taking effect of any
such rule or rules, and may contract for the printing and arrange for the
distribution of copies of such rules and pay for the costs thereof out of
money appropriated for that purpose.
Sec. 5. Any provision or rule provided by statute or rule of court
relating to any procedure referred to in section 1 hereof, in force at the
time this act becomes effective, shall remain in full force and effect until
the Supreme Court shall by a rule or rules, made and adopted hereunder,
prescribe procedure inconsistent with or in lieu thereof. After any such
rule or rules are made and adopted by the Supreme Court, as herein provided, then from and after the time fixed by order of said court for the
same to be in force all legal procedure in all the courts of this state shall
be had in conformity with such rules and all of said courts shall be bound
thereby.
Sec. 6. All laws or parts of laws inconsistent with this act are hereby
repealed.
MINORITY Comm u REPORT
Mr. President:
A minority of your Committee on Judiciary A, to which was referred
Senate Bill No. 120, has had the same under consideration and begs leave
to report the same back to the Senate with recommendation that said bill
be indefinitely postponed.
CUTHBERTSON.

Lost.

ADAMS.

MAJoRITY COMMITTEE REPORT
Mr. President:
A majority of your Committee on Judiciary A, to which was referred
Senate Bill No. 120, had the same under consideration and begs leave
to report the same back to the Senate with the recommendation that said
bill be amended by striking out all of section 3.
And when so amended that said bill do pass.
HOFFMAN.
KETCHUM.

NIBLACK.
CLOUSEa.
MOORHEAD.
GARRorT.
Adopted.

BERKEY.
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APPENDIX B
ENGROSSED SENATE BILL No. 227
A Bill for an Act entitled an act concerning appeals to the Supreme and
Appellate Courts, and repealing all laws and parts of laws in conflict
therewith.
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of
Indiana, That all appeals authorized to be taken to the Supreme and
Appellate Courts, except those enumerated in sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of
this act, shall be taken within 120 days from the time the judgment is
rendered in the trial court, or in case a motion for a new trial is filed and
not disposed of before judgment is rendered or motion to modify the judgment is filed, then within 120 days-from the time such motion or motions
are overruled. Where the appellant is under legal disability he may take
his appeal at any time within 120 days after the disability is removed.
Sec. 2. Appeals by the state in criminal cases as now provided for by
law shall be taken within sixty days.
Sec. 3. Appeals from interlocutory orders shall be taken within thirty
days from the date thereof.
Sec. 4. An appeal by any person considering himself aggrieved by any
decision of a probate or circuit court or a judge thereof in vacation growing
out of any matter connected with a decedent's estate shall be taken within
thirty days.
Sec. 5. Appeals from orders appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver shall be taken by any party aggrieved thereby within ten days from
the date of such order, without awaiting the final determination of the
case. In case a receiver has been appointed the supersedeas bond referred
to in section 8 of this act shall be in such sum as may have been required
of the receiver.

See. 6. The court to which an appeal is to be taken may grant an
appellant a reasonable extension of time in which to file his transcript of
the record upon a positive showing in a petition under oath that the reporter who reported the case will be unable within the time provided for by
this act to complete said transcript either because of the illness of such
reporter or because the said transcript will be of such size that it will
be physicially impossible for the reporter to finish it within such time.
Such petition shall state the date upon which it will be submitted to the
court for action and shall be accompanied by a showing that notice has been
served upon or has been waived by all other parties to the action or their
attorney at law more than five days before the date set for such submission.
Sec. 7. Appeals shall be taken by procuring from the clerk of the court
in which judgment was rendered a certified transcript of the record or proceedings, or such portion thereof as is necessary to present the error relied
upon by the party appealing, and filing the same in the office of the clerk
of the Supreme Court, which clerk shall endorse thereon the time of such
filing.
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Sec. 8. All parties to the action in the trial court shall be notified
of such appeal. The party or parties taking the appeal, before filing such
transcript in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court, may serve on
the other parties to the action notice that such appeal will be taken, and
attach to and file with such transcript written acknowledgment by said
party or parties or by their attorneys at law of record of the receipt of
such notice, or proof of the service on such parties or attorneys at law
duly verified under oath by the person serving the same. If acknowledgment of notice or proof of the serving of notice on any party or parties
is not made and filed with the transcript, the clerk of the Supreme Court
shall issue to such party or parties a notice showing the filing of such
appeal and cause the same to be served forthwith upon said party or
parties by the sheriff of the Supreme Court, or by the sheriff of the county
wherein such party or parties reside or maintain a resident agent. If any
party to an appeal be a non-resident of the State of Indiana and no
acknowledgment of service be filed as to such party, it shall be the duty of
the Supreme Court to give notice by publication to such party, one time
each week, for three successive weeks in a daily newspaper published in
Indianapolis.
Sec. 9. If an appeal be taken by a defendant in a criminal case the
notice provided for in section 8 of this act shall be given to the prosecuting attorney. Immediately upon the filing of the transcript of the record
in every criminal case the clerk of the Supreme Court shall notify the
Attorney General thereof.
If an appeal be taken by the state in a criminal case notice as provided
for in section 8 of this act shall be served upon the defendant or his
attorney.
Sec. 10. The party or parties taking the appeal shall file with the
transcript and at the time the same is filed a bond for costs payable to
the clerk of the Supreme Court with such penalty and surety as he shall
approve conditioned upon the due prosecution of said appeal and the payment of the costs occasioned thereby.
Sec. 11. An appeal shall not stay further proceedings upon the judgment of a trial court unless a supersedeas bond shall be filed, except that
in appeals by executors or administrators or by the state or any municipal
subdivision thereof the judgment shall be stayed without bond. Upon the
filing and approval of a supersedeas bond the judgment of the trial court
shall be stayed until the further order of the court of appeal. Before the
transcript is filed on appeal such supersedeas bond may be filed and approved in the trial court, and after the transcript is filed on appeal such
bond may be filed and approved in the court to which the appeal is taken.
Such supersedeas bond, with such penalty and surety as the court may approve, shall be payable to the appellee with condition that the appellant
will duly prosecute the appeal and abide by and pay any judgment that
may be affirmed against him.
If the appeal is taken from a judgment for the recovery of real
property or possession thereof, by the party against whom the judgment for the recovery is rendered, then the condition of the bond shall
further provide that the appellant shall also pay all damages which
may be sustained by the appellee for the mesne profits, waste or dam-
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age of the land during the pending of the appeal; and if from a judgment for the recovery or return of personal property, or such property
or its value, that he deliver or return the property, he shall also pay a
reasonable value for its use or any damage it may sustain during the
pending of the appeal.
See. 12. Appeals in criminal cases shall not stay the execution of
the judgment unless the appellant shall give bail in the manner provided
by law.
Sec. 13. A complete transcript of the record on appeal shall consist of all pleadings and papers filed and all action taken in the case by
the parties and by the trial court before and during the trial and disposition thereof, including the examination of the jury, opening statements
and arguments of counsel, all of the evidence both oral and written, all
objections, all instructions tendered, refused, modified and given, all agreements of counsel, and any and all other matters or actions which occurred.
Either the original papers or copies thereof may be used in making the
transcript of the record. Every pleading, motion in writing, deposition or
other paper filed, or offered to be filed in any cause or proceeding whether
received by the court, refused or stricken out, shall be a part of th record
from the time of such filing or offer to file. Any order or action of the
court in respect to any pleading, motion in writing, report, deposition or
other paper and every oral motion and the ruling of the court thereon
shall be entered by the clerk on the minutes or record of the court, and the
same, when so entered, shall be a part of the record.
Sec. 14. An appellant need not file a complete transcript of the record
on appeal, but may present only such portion thereof as will clearly present the ruling or matter called in question, together with a succinct recital of the substance of such part of the evidence and proceedings as shall
be necessary to advise the court on appeal of the pertinency or materiality
of the matters sought to be reviewed.
See. 15. It shall not be necessary for the transcript of the record to
contain all the evidence given in the cause or proceeding unless the decision of the trial court or the verdict of the jury shall be called in question
as being contrary to law or not sustained by sufficient evidence.
See. 16. No bill of exceptions shall be necessary to bring into a record
on appeal to the Supreme or Appellate Courts anything that was before
the trial court or any decision, ruling or action that was taken by the
trial court. An exception shall be deemed by law to have been taken for
every party to every decision, ruling or action of a trial court adverse to
such party and it shall not be necessary for any party to save, reserve or
take an exception either orally or in writing to any decision, ruling or
action of a trial court.
Sec. 17. There is hereby imposed on the clerk of every trial court,
with the aid and assistance of the judge and reporter thereof, the duty of
keeping a complete record of the trial of every action, including all matter which has heretobefore been preserved for record through the use of
bills of exceptions and any and all other matters which may be requested
and which may be made the basis for review by the Supreme and Appellate
Courts.
Sec. 18. It shall be the duty of the official reporter to take down in
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short-hand all evidence given, objections made and all action taken in connection with the trial or disposition of cases which are not otherwise a
matter of record, for the purpose of preserving an accurate report thereof
for the possible future use as a part of the record on appeal. The performance of such duty may be waived by agreement of all the parties with
the consent of the trial court. In the event any action is not thus preserved it shall be the duty of the trial judge, when requested, with the
assistance of the parties, to prepare and file with the clerk of the trial
court, a condensed recital of the evidence given, objections made and all
action taken so that the same may and it will thereby become a part of the
record.
Sec. 19. A party desiring to take an appeal from a judgment of a
trial court to the Supreme or Appellate Court shall file a written request
or precipe with the clerk of such trial court for a complete transcript of
the record, or if a complete transcript is not desired, for such portions and
so much thereof as the party shall in writing indicate, of the cause of
action in which said judgment was rendered.
In the event any other party to the judgment shall desire a complete
transcript of the record upon such appeal, or shall desire a part or parts
of the record not required by the precipe so filed, he may file with the
clerk his precipe in like form. Such precipe or precipes shall constitute a
part of the record and shall be included therein.
It shall be the duty of such clerk to prepare and certify such record.
The clerk shall obtain from the reporter or the judge the material necessary to complete the record: Provided, That the clerk and reporter before
performing any duty hereunder shall be entitled to demand and receive
security for the costs and fees which may properly and legally accrue to
either in the performance of such duties. The portion of the record prepared by the reporter shall when completed be certified to under oath by
the reporter as being a true and correct report of the proceedings and
when so certified it shall be submitted by such reporter or by the clerk to
the judge who tried the case either in term or in vacation and he shall
promptly correct it if correction be needed, settle it, and sign it, whereupon it shall become a part of the record to be included by the clerk in the
transcript on appeal.
In case of the disability, absence, removal from office or death of the
judge trying the case the clerk of the court shall certify to such fact, following the reporter's certificate under oath and thereupon such transcript
furnished by the reporter shall become a part of the record.
Sec. 20. The certificate of the clerk to the transcript of the record
shall be in substantially the following form: State of Indiana, County
Clerk of the
s. I -------------------------of---------------------------------- Court, within and for said county and state,
do hereby certify that the above and foregoing transcript contains full,
true and correct copies or the originals, of all papers and entries in said
cause required by the above and foregoing precipe (or precipes). Witness
, this
my hand and the seal of said court at -----------------------Clerk.
day of --------------------------------------------Sec. 21. If the court to which the appeal is taken shall be of the
opinion that the record brought up by an appellant does not contain suf-
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ficient matter to present the question raised in his brief or if there be
some defect or informality in the transcript or other proceedings in connection with the appeal, the appeal shall not by reason thereof be dismissed, but the appellant shall have the right, within a reasonable time to
be prescribed by the court of appeal, to correct such informality or defect
or to bring up any additional part of the record by a writ of certiorari
directed to the clerk of the trial court. When an appeal has been dismissed for want of prosecution, the court may reinstate it at the same or
next term, good cause being shown.
Sec. 22. Any co-party not joining in the appeal, may within the time
allowed for the appeal, or within thirty days after the transcript of the
record has been filed on appeal, file in the court to which the appeal is
taken a statement that he desires to present the errors as to himself and
have all questions properly presented decided by the court, and he shall
then have all rights in relation to such appeal that he would have had if
he had joined in the appeal originally.
Sec. 23. All error of the trial court shall be before the court on appeal without assignment of error therein, but the Supreme Court may
make reasonable rules as to the presentment of errors and cross-errors
and the waiver thereof in the briefs filed on appeal.
See. 24. Other procedure as to the conduct and disposition of appeals
shall be governed by the rules of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 25. This act shall be in effect beginning July 15, 1931, and shall
not govern the appeal of any case the trial of which was begun or had
before that date.
See. 26. The following acts and parts of acts are hereby repealed:
Sections 403, 405, 406, 407, 629, 632, 633, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640,
642, 643, 646, 647, and 660 of an act entitled "An act concerning proceedings in civil cases approved April 7, 1881, and all amendments of said
sections, the sections referred to being sections 683, 685, 686, 694, 696,
698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 707, 711, 716, 717, 819, 721, and 724 of Burns
revised statutes of 1926.
An act entitled "An act in relation to appeals to the Supreme and Appellate Courts," approved March 9, 1895, section 1 thereof being section
706 Burns revised statutes of 1926.
An act entitled "An act prescribing the manner in which evidence given
in any civil or criminal cause may become a part of the record upon
appeal to the Supreme or Appellate Court; repealing all laws in conflict
herewith and declaring an emergency," approved March 8, 1897, section 1
thereof, being section 691 Burns revised statutes of 1926.
An act entitled "An act to amend section 629 of an act entitled an act
concerning proceedings in civil cases, approved April 7, 1881, and declaring an emergency," approved January 20, 1899, being section 707 Burns
revised statutes of 1926.
Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of an act entitled "An act concerning proceedings in civil procedure," approved March 9, 1903, and all amendments
of said sections, the sections referred to being sections 684, 688, 689, 692,
and 693 of Burns revised statutes of 1926.
An act entitled "An act providing for the extension and re-extension
of time within which to file bill of exceptions," approved February 25,
1905, being section 687 Burns revised statutes of 1926.
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An act entitled "An act concerning proceedings and appeals in criminal cases," approved March 6, 1905, being section 2379 Burns revised
statutes of 1926.
Sections 287, 288, 289, 326, 328, 330, 333 of an act entitled "An act
concerning public offenses," approved March 10, 1905, being sections 2330,
2331, 2332, 2380, 2382, 2384 and 2393 Burns revised statutes of 1926.
An act entitled "An act providing for a re-extension of time within
which to file a bill of exceptions containing the evidence when the court
reporter fails or is unable to furnish a transcript of the evidence within
the time given and repealing an act entitled 'An act providing for the
extension and re-extension of time within which to file bill of exceptions,'
approved February 25, 1905," approved March 3, 1911, and being section
687 Burns revised statutes of 1926.
An act entitled "An act to amend sections four hundred and eight (408)
and six hundred and forty (640) of an act entitled "An act concerning
proceedings in civil cases," approved April 7, 1881, and to amend section
one (1) of an act entitled "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to
amend section two hundred and twenty-nine (229) of an act entitled "An
act providing for the settlement and distribution of decedent's estates,"
approved April 14, 1881, which section is numbered 2455 in the revised
statutes of 1881, approved April 11, 1885,' the same being section 2455 of
Horner's annotated statutes of 1897, approved March 3, 1899," approved
February 26, 1913, and being section 696 Burns revised statutes of 1926.
An act entitled "An act to amend section three (3) of an act entitled
'An act concerning proceedings in civil procedure' approved March 9, 1903,
and declaring an emergency," approved March 15, 1915, and being section 684 Burns revised statutes of 1926.
An act entitled "An act to amend section 289 of an act entitled 'An
act concerning public offenses' approved March 10, 1905, and declaring
an emergency," approved March 5, 1915, being section 2332 Burns revised
statutes of 1926.
An act entitled "An act to amend section six hundred and thirty-two
(632) of an act entitled 'An act concerning proceedings in civil cases' approved April 7, 1881, and declaring an emergency," approved February
27, 1917, and being section 698 Burns revised statutes of 1926.
An act entitled "An act concerning proceedings in civil cases of appeals from interlocutory judgments and orders," approved March 11, 1921,
said act being sections 712, 713, 714 and 715 of Burns revised statutes of
1926.
MINORITY REPORT
Mr. Speaker:
A minority of your Committee on Judiciary B, to which was referred
Engrossed Senate Bill No. 227, has had the same under consideration and
begs leave to report the same back to the House with the recommendation
that said bill be indefinitely postponed.
WATSON.
SIMMONS.
VANDERVEER.
Lost.
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MAjonrry REPORT

Mr. Speaker:
A majority of your Committtee on Judiciary B, to which was referred
Engrossed Senate Bill No. 227, has had the same under consideration and
begs leave to report the same back to the House with the recommendation
that said bill do pass.
McCAIN.
DEN.
BATES.
SimpsoN.
EGAN.
BACHTENKIRCHER.
HAINES.
STREET.
GRIMM.
ALE.

Adopted.

